The day after the election, Vice President JD Vance wrote on X that the main reason for the Republican’s dramatic defeat was the American public’s opposition to the war. “Everyone knows why we lost. And any honest conversation about where we go from here must start there,” he wrote, referring to the ongoing conflict that began with US-Israeli airstrikes against Iran in late February 2026.
While it is rare for a vice president to make a statement so critical of his own administration’s policies, President Donald Trump later said he did not disagree with Vance’s assessment of the role frustration over the Iran war played in voters’ minds.
But it is not yet clear whether this will change Trump’s view on the next steps in the ongoing conflict. Reports in recent weeks have indicated that the U.S. military is actively preparing options and increasing its capabilities in the Persian Gulf region in the event the president orders a resumption of hostilities.
As an expert on Middle Eastern affairs and a former senior National Security Council official under the first Trump administration, I am aware that months of conflict have failed to bring Iran to its knees, force regime change, or militarily defeat a perceived threat to U.S. assets and allies. A current escalation is unlikely to change these realities — and it carries the added risk of further harming Republicans in the eyes of American voters as they look toward the 2028 presidential race.
Furthermore, even if Trump were to escalate the conflict, it is unclear how much room for maneuver he would have in January in the face of a Democratic Congress almost uniformly opposed to the war.
Sunk costs
Part of the problem facing Iran war hawks in Washington today is that the conflict has caused serious setbacks for the regime in Tehran without satisfying the officially stated strategic reasons for going to war.
They argue that a withdrawal now – as welcome as it might be for Americans facing the resulting rise in fuel prices – could allow Iran to rebuild before the conflict is “won.” Moreover, it would render unnecessary the military and reputational costs already swallowed up by Washington.
Among the achievements of this war touted by the Trump administration is the death of former Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, as well as the assassination of numerous senior leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – including individuals like the former head of Iran’s National Security Council, Ali Larijani. Important elements of Iran’s air defense and radar network, ballistic missile and drone production, and storage and launch sites were also destroyed. And Iran’s already obsolete navy and air force have deteriorated further.
Meanwhile, the U.S.-imposed naval blockade of Iran-linked shipping in the Persian Gulf has cut off a crucial lifeline to the Iranian economy. And additional economic sanctions and penalties imposed by Washington have served to further devalue the Iranian currency and deprive Iran of additional financial ties to the international banking system.
Down but not out
Yet for all of America’s success in degrading the Iranian military through unlimited aerial bombardment and significant financial pressure against the Iranian economy, a clear endgame remains elusive.
Despite the weakening of the Iranian government – now led by Ali Khameinei’s son, Mojtaba, and a new echelon of senior IRGC commanders – the Islamic Republic remains intact. Additionally, it still possesses enough ballistic missiles and drones to put the region at risk, while continuing to impose significant control over its population.
Meanwhile, U.S. military spending continues to rise. In September, the US Congressional Budget Office estimated that the military costs of the war in Iran were already at $38 billion. Since then, this number has only increased. And that’s to say nothing of the global economic costs associated with Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a key shipping route for oil and gas.
If Trump decided to change course on Iran, he — and others — might feel that the money, efforts and lives of 19 U.S. service members killed in the conflict would have been spent without any obvious objective being achieved. However, continued military spending without a strategic purpose could only amplify these same costs.
For Iran, the midterm results did not change its public position. Mojtaba Khameini issued statements ordering the IRGC to widen the conflict in the region and possibly beyond if the United States and Israel attacked again. At the same time, a statement attributed to him indicates that hostilities between the United States and Iran will persist regardless of the balance of political power in Washington.
This raises questions about the prospects for diplomacy. Over the summer, the United States and Iran agreed to an initial 14-point memorandum of understanding that, if finalized, could have permanently ended hostilities. But since the 60-day deadline for this agreement passed, no parallel diplomatic agreement has seen the light of day.
No practical solution
Even with this major shift in the U.S. political landscape, it remains unclear whether Trump will resume operations against Iran before the new Congress is sworn in. Israel’s messy election result — which left pro-war and incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyanu with potentially more reason to redouble his efforts in Iran — only complicates matters.
The U.S. military certainly appears ready to engage in a new round of attacks against Iran if asked, and Iran is ready to retaliate. But given the gaps in the U.S. inventory — with munitions, missiles and air defense capabilities depleted by eight months of war — Trump and his inner circle will have to approach escalation with caution.
Iran could force the situation by engaging in asymmetric attacks in the region or beyond, something it has not yet attempted. Or it could launch a coordinated offensive with its partners in the region – notably the Houthis in Yemen, who have become more active in their own conflict with Saudi Arabia in recent months.
But barring one event that the Trump administration believes would enable it to act, no clear indication is emerging from Washington as to which direction it will take.
Vance diagnosed a widely perceived political problem among Republicans: Voters don’t want any more war. But what he clearly didn’t mention was a practical solution. The conflict in the Middle East – and the role of the United States in it – is, as such, at an impasse.
Both America and Iran have incurred significant political, military, and economic costs. A decision not to pursue an endgame would leave those who sank; this can only increase them.
Javed Ali, associate professor of public policy practice, University of Michigan
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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