Off the record: Trump accuses Zelensky of covering up his own mess in dramatic week for Ukraine

Welcome back to Unofficially after another eventful week.


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I like to joke with our deputy director of European news, Maia de la Baume, that things can’t get crazier with each passing week. Every time, I’m wrong. This is bad news for my immune system which has finally succumbed to a cold.

This week I spent time in Warsaw ahead of the European Council summit in Brussels, which ended as I sat down to put down this newsletter next to my Kleenex.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was in Brussels for the summit on Friday, seeking to shore up support after a brutal week for kyiv. The mood in Ukraine as winter approaches could not be more gloomy.

Fears of a move away grew this week after the United States announced a shock deal to ease sanctions on Russian diesel in a desperate attempt to lower fuel prices. The agreement is deeply flawed. This gives Russia another revenue boost with no strings attached and little benefit beyond temporary relief.

It should be clear by now that President Donald Trump is panicking about the US midterm elections. Gasoline prices have soared since the start of the year, driving up the cost of living for Americans. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US national average gasoline price reached $4.27 per gallon this week.

If you know anything about Americans, they expect cheap energy – and plenty of it. Pump prices and fears of an economic slowdown will prove decisive in the medium term.

Much of the pain comes from the collateral effects of the US-Israeli war against Iran. Today, one could argue that Tehran poses a real threat to global security and, as Trump himself has suggested, that the country is run by a bunch of madmen. They are. But they are not stupid.

Iran has successfully militarized the Strait of Hormuz, preventing the passage of around a fifth of the world’s oil supply. It’s a problem for everyone. And someone will have to take responsibility for it. Trump chose Zelensky.

Of course, Ukraine is destroying Russian refineries, hitting Moscow where it hurts and reducing global refining capacity. But that is not the root of the problem. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is here – and Trump has no quick solution to this situation.

Instead, the US president sharply escalated his rhetoric against Zelensky, accusing him of creating “problems for our ranchers, our farmers and the world.” He also suggested that Zelensky, whom he once described as “a modestly successful comedian,” claims to want peace with Russia while working against it. Ukraine should therefore have a new leader.

This is a shocking statement about a country that survives daily missile strikes and, coincidentally or not, this week encountered serious operational difficulties with intelligence and critical infrastructure needed to prevent more deaths.

Trump has never used this kind of language towards Russian Vladimir Putin. He also never called on Putin to hold free elections. His comments reveal a striking bias, inappropriate for a country seeking to mediate between the two sides. There is also an element of personal animosity.

The American president criticized everything about Zelensky: his military outfit (he now wears a black jacket), his manners (remember the “you don’t have the cards” episode?) and his refusal to budge. Trump’s frustration appears to stem from his perception of Zelensky as an obstacle to peace.

There is much to be said about Zelensky’s tactics, his diplomatic missteps and the serious allegations of corruption involving his senior officials. But when it comes to war, he is right to stand his ground: the quick deal Trump wants is bad for both Ukraine and Europe.

Zelensky also makes a fair point: refineries become legitimate military targets when they help finance the Russian war machine. It could be argued that pressure is necessary in any negotiation to force tough decisions – but it has to go both ways. Trump appears to intend to apply it in only one direction.

This reflects the calculation of the American administration. Washington seems convinced that the war is unlikely to change much: the conflict has become a war of attrition, the front line is largely frozen, and Ukraine cannot reconquer territories occupied by Russia while inflicting brutal damage on civilians. The human cost will increase, but little will change on the ground.

The United States also seems to believe – wrongly, in my opinion – that it is possible to convince Putin to return to the negotiating table through trade deals and economic incentives, and by persuading Moscow that ending the war is in its own interest. But this approach risks misinterpreting Putin’s motivations.

Don’t just take my word for it.

In 2021, Putin published an essay titled “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” He argued that the two were one people, thereby denying the historical legitimacy of Ukrainian independence. Full-scale war broke out a year later.

For Ukrainians, this is a war of survival – the survival of an independent nation.

Zelensky has not budged on territorial concessions, and this is understandable, because the issue goes beyond a piece of land.

No one has yet explained what would happen after a hypothetical territorial exchange, which kyiv would never recognize. de jure anyway. Are the United States ready to offer ironclad security guarantees in exchange? And what would these guarantees look like in practice?

No country would willingly give up part of its territory – including land that Russia doesn’t even control – in exchange for promises that, for now, amount to nothing more than words. And what would happen to the broader European security architecture, which caught fire in the wake of the invasion?

Zelensky arrived in the Belgian capital on Friday with a message of gratitude. He thanked EU institutions and leaders, whom he described as “real leaders”, in apparent anger at Trump. But he also showed up with a list of unresolved problems.

Ukraine is heading into a harsh winter, with much of its energy infrastructure destroyed by Russia, an urgent need for air defense and billions in new funding for 2027.

In his speech to leaders, he said next year’s war would cost 155 billion euros, of which 70 billion would have to be financed by Europeans. He urged them to find the resources, arguing that his estimate is realistic.

Two things stand out. Ukraine assumes that the war will last at least another year and therefore must budget for it. And the Europeans will have to foot a substantial part of the bill, with the United States no longer providing them with any aid.

Last December, European leaders signed a 90 billion euro loan intended to cover two years of financial needs. We now know that this will not be enough. And Ukraine will probably never be able to repay it.

The question of financing may be rudimentary, but it is crucial.

European leaders know that liquidity is limited. The EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, told me in an interview this week that it is palpable that European public opinion has changed compared to four years ago, because there is an element of weariness.

The mega-election cycle in Europe over the next 12 months does not play into Ukraine’s hands, and the EU should be clear-headed about this.

In France, Marine Le Pen, leading the polls, took advantage of her visit to Brussels this week to send a message to Brussels and to Zelensky: she is not paying.

Considering that France is “on the verge of default,” Le Pen said the country could no longer afford to contribute to the common pot for Ukraine. If others want to pay, she says, that’s fine, but France won’t do it.

She seems to be inspired by the Trumpian model: Ukraine is not its taxpayers’ problem. In Germany, the AfD says Berlin shouldn’t do it either. Certainly, this is a minority position within the Council of the EU, and it is not even certain that these parties will come to power. But that doesn’t mean we should ignore them.

These parties are successfully exploiting a growing social and economic malaise in Europe. This does not work in Ukraine’s favor. And there is also a legitimate question at the heart of this debate: where will the European Union find 70 to 90 billion euros, potentially every year?

Issue more debt? Exploit frozen Russian assets? Open the pool of international donors? Use its influence on third countries to increase their contributions? And what is the strategy behind this massive war effort?

Meeting in Brussels, leaders asked the European Commission to propose options to close the funding gap by November. Privately, diplomats agree that it will be up to Europe to keep Ukraine in the fight or give Russia the upper hand. But we don’t know how they will achieve this.

Emmanuel Macron told reporters it was far too early to talk about 70 billion euros, but several diplomats told Euronews that Brussels would probably have to increase its debt. Even though there has been talk of reviving the idea of ​​using frozen Russian assets, this remains a distant project, close to wishful thinking.

This is a serious time for Ukraine. Difficult decisions will have to be made.

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