OPINION: The Houthis are not someone else’s problem. America can’t afford to look the other way
This is an extract from a opinion article by Fox Ali Shihabi, Saudi author and political analyst.
Some in Washington would like to believe that the Houthis are someone else’s problem. It’s easy to understand why. America is already deeply engaged in the war against Iran, and there is little appetite to widen the battlefield as the midterm elections approach. The Houthis also cynically gave Washington reason to limit its involvement by signaling that American ships would not be targeted.
But Yemen is not a separate conflict. The Houthis – a US-designated foreign terrorist organization aligned with Iran and armed and supported by Tehran – are waging a campaign against the Saudi-backed government of Yemen that is part of the same regional confrontation.
The good news is that the war is starting to move in the right direction for the Yemeni government, although the battle will be difficult and, like all battles, will have its ups and downs. Government forces, backed by Saudi airpower, have expelled the Houthis from some strategically important areas around Bab el-Mandeb and are demonstrating their ability to operate effectively. These achievements remain fragile, but the dynamics of the battlefield are encouraging.
It also changes the calculus of American involvement. The United States already provides Saudi Arabia with intelligence and targeted support, but without carrying out direct strikes. This help is valuable. U.S. satellites and other surveillance systems can help locate missile batteries, drone installations, command centers and mobile launchers.
Direct U.S. air power could make this intelligence considerably more effective. U.S. aircraft can operate directly within U.S. intelligence, surveillance and targeting networks, allowing information gathered by satellites and other sensors to flow quickly down the chain from sensor to shooter. Saudi aircraft can also receive sophisticated U.S. and allied targeting information, including through interoperable systems, but intelligence shared with a partner may require additional dissemination, dissemination, and command steps before reaching the attacking aircraft. Even a short delay counts when a mobile missile launcher can fire, move, and disappear in minutes.
Placing American aircraft directly in this sensor-shooter loop could therefore shorten the time between detection and attack of a target. A limited U.S. role could focus on mobile missile launchers, drone installations and other time-sensitive assets rather than expanding to a large-scale or open-ended campaign. This would make it possible to more quickly and effectively exploit the intelligence that Washington already collects and shares.
Direct participation by the US Air Force would therefore be very useful, but it is not essential to the success of the campaign. Saudi Arabia has the aircraft, intelligence capabilities and resources to support the Yemeni government, while Yemeni troops are proving capable of carrying out the ground fighting themselves. Washington could, however, make the campaign faster and more effective without taking responsibility for the war.
Gn bussni
