Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – After nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, Ethiopian federal forces entered the Tigray capital of Mekelle as forces from an alliance of rebel groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), withdrew from the city.
The fighting that erupted late last month effectively ended the 2022 Pretoria ceasefire and the fragile peace that followed Tigray’s devastating war.
But the capture of Mekelle could mark the end of conventional warfare rather than the end of the conflict. Fighting continued elsewhere in Tigray, while reports of Eritrean troops entering towns in northern Tigray added a potentially more dangerous regional dimension.
Ethiopian federal forces used air power and ground forces to advance across Tigray. After suffering successive defeats around the towns of Alamata and Kobo, the rebel forces withdrew into the surrounding countryside. They pledged to continue the fight.
“We will confront the enemy on our terms and where we want,” said TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael.
A war that may not be over
There are echoes of the war that began in 2020, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government declared victory after federal forces captured Mekelle. Tigrayan forces then regrouped in the mountains, retook much of the region and reconquered the capital, prolonging the war for almost a year and a half.
The renewed conflict could follow a similar trajectory, particularly if the TPLF and other armed groups manage to transform the mountainous terrain into a protracted armed rebellion. Ethiopia is already fighting insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, raising concerns that its federal forces will be spread across multiple fronts.
But setbacks suffered by the rebels on the battlefield could have implications far beyond Tigray. They have raised concerns in Egypt and other Ethiopian rivals, according to Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an Africa analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute.
“Egypt considers the Renaissance Dam and any Ethiopian (army) advance towards the Red Sea as a strategic threat, which is why it has allied itself with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia against any Ethiopian unilateralism,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.
“Ethiopia is looking for a maritime outlet; Eritrea sees it as an existential threat.”
Ethiopian ambitions in the Red Sea
Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea won its war for independence in 1991, leaving Addis Ababa heavily dependent on neighboring countries for access to international trade.
Abiy has increasingly made access to the Red Sea a strategic priority since 2023, raising concerns in Eritrea over Ethiopian ambitions, particularly over the port of Assab.
Ethiopia currently relies heavily on Djibouti for its maritime trade, while also seeking alternative arrangements, including through Kenya and Somaliland.
After being sworn in on Monday for a new five-year term following his party’s victory in the June 1 elections, Abiy once again placed this issue at the center of his parliamentary speech.
“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” he told Parliament.
The issue is increasingly part of a broader regional conflict.
Loose regional alignment
In recent months, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves sharing concerns about Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. On October 4, leaders of the four countries gathered for a quadrilateral consultative summit in New Alamein, Egypt, where they discussed regional issues and pledged to strengthen political, economic and trade cooperation as well as consultation and coordination.
The meeting does not constitute a formal military alliance and the four countries have different interests in their relations with Addis Ababa. The summit’s joint declaration also calls for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
But their concerns increasingly overlap around Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea, the Nile and the wider Horn of Africa.
Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also deteriorated significantly since the Pretoria ceasefire. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled its Eritrean diplomats on October 1, accusing Asmara of hostile acts and involvement in renewed fighting. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties, while denying support for the opposition alliance. Egypt and Sudan have also denied Ethiopian accusations that they support the alliance.
The advance of the Ethiopian army into Tigray has added another layer to this rivalry.
“The advance (of the Ethiopian army) in Tigray directly threatens (Eritrean President) Isaias (Afwerki) and the Eritrean state,” said Etana H Dinka, assistant professor of African history at the University of Miami.
Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops during the 2020-2022 Tigray War, but relations between Abiy and Isaias have since deteriorated. Eritrean troops have reportedly been seen in towns in northern Tigray, adding a potentially significant new dimension to the conflict. The Associated Press news agency reported that Eritrean troops entered Adigrat and Idaga Hamus after crossing the Ethiopian border, while Eritrea neither confirmed nor denied the troop movements.
Eritrea’s role could be decisive
For Eritrea, the location of the fighting matters as much as its outcome.
A prolonged conflict in Tigray could keep Ethiopian forces constrained and limit Addis Ababa’s ability to pursue its Red Sea ambitions. But a decisive Ethiopian victory could give the federal government greater freedom to turn its attention to its regional rivals.
“With reports that Eritrean troops are moving towards Tigray, Eritrea appears to want to reinforce the withdrawal of TPLF forces to the north, so that the engagement between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers takes place on the territory of Tigray, and not in Eritrea,” said Mohamed Kheir Omer, a researcher specializing in the Horn of Africa.
This could prompt Eritrea to support forces capable of keeping the Ethiopian army under control, without necessarily entering into direct confrontation.
Sudan adds another layer
The war in Sudan adds another dimension to the regional rivalry.
Egypt has provided political support and logistical and technical support to the Sudanese army, according to the Reuters news agency, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of atrocities in Darfur.
Ethiopia has been accused of facilitating support for RSF. A Reuters investigation reported in February that Ethiopia hosted a camp in its western Benishangul-Gumuz region where thousands of RSF-linked fighters were being trained. Reuters cited eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, who said the UAE financed the construction of the camp and provided military trainers and logistical support. The UAE denied the allegations and Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s role.
These competing relationships are part of a broader struggle over the Nile, Sudan, the Red Sea and access to trade routes.
For Egypt, its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern. For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s search for an outlet to the Red Sea is considered from the perspective of national security. For Sudan’s neighbors, the conflict threatens to reshape regional balances of power.
Will Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia intervene?
The shared interests of Ethiopia’s regional rivals do not necessarily translate into direct intervention.
Egypt has its own calculations on the Nile and Sudan. Eritrea has a direct security interest in developments in Tigray. Somalia faces its own security challenges and complicated relations with Addis Ababa. Sudan remains ravaged by its devastating civil war.
At the same time, Ethiopia’s federal forces now face the possibility of fighting on multiple fronts.
The TPLF, Amhara Fano, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) have each sought to challenge the federal government in different parts of the country. If they can maintain pressure on the army while withdrawing from major population centers, the fall of Mekelle could prove to be only the first phase of a much longer conflict.
For Ethiopia’s rivals, the question is whether they should exploit this vulnerability or avoid getting drawn into another regional war.
The extent of any regional involvement could ultimately depend on the TPLF’s ability to keep federal forces linked to Tigray and away from the Eritrean border.
“It is not difficult to understand Cairo’s commitment to preventing Ethiopia from succeeding in the current war, regardless of its military’s intended goals, including Abiy’s acclaimed access to the Red Sea,” said Dinka of the University of Miami.
The question now is whether these regional calculations will remain largely diplomatic or spill over onto the battlefield.
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